Hezbollah members and supporters conduct a funeral for their assassinated military chief on November 24, 2025, in Beirut, Lebanon.

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Tom O'Connor

By Tom O'Connor

Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy

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As Iran grapples with internal unrest and threats from foreign foes, its Axis of Resistance allies are preparing for potential confrontations on their own territories without counting on the direct support of the Islamic Republic.

The coalition, established over the course of decades with aid from Iran and its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), had long served as a network of largely non-state actors, with the exceptions of Iran and Syria, that shared aims of opposing Israel, countering U.S. and Saudi influence and defeating rival militants such as the Islamic State (ISIS).

The core collective goal of mounting a united front against Israel was put to test in October 2023 after the Palestinian Hamas movement ignited a regional war with its surprise attack that drew in Lebanon's Hezbollah, Yemen's Ansar Allah as well as a number of factions constituting the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which also operated out of Syria.

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While the confrontation saw each of these groups take action against Israel, they also suffered major blows, including the killing of key personnel and destruction of equipment. The toppling of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the hands of an Islamist-led rebel offensive amid the war marked another major setback, cutting Iran's logistical ties to the front lines with Israel.

The conflict also resulted in Iran's long-touted strategy of establishing strategic depth against Israel being rolled back to the Islamic Republic's own territory, particularly during the 12-Day War that saw the archfoes exchange direct strikes and an unprecedented U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites.

With Iran today focused increasingly on domestic security following some of the largest protests to rock the nation in years, and threats of renewed U.S. intervention, factions of the Axis of Resistance are in the midst of a major recalibration that Renad Mansour, director of the Chatham House's Iraq Initiative, argued has been years in the making.

"I think it's been actually a few years where we've seen a change in the structure of the Axis of Resistance away from that sort of hierarchical structure in which Iran was the top, and it had all of these proxies or clients in the region, and Iran invested heavily in them and they represented effectively Iran's forward defense in the Middle East," Mansour told Newsweek.

Now, with the possibility of the Axis of Resistance's enemies taking action to exploit Iran's distraction, Mansour said "they're still there fighting for themselves and prioritizing local survival."

Hezbollah members and supporters hold a funeral for their assassinated military chief on November 24, 2025, in Beirut.

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Hezbollah's Existential Battle

Hezbollah, established in the 1980s amid resistance to Israeli intervention during Lebanon's multisided civil war that ranged from 1975–1999, has long been viewed as the most powerful arm of the Axis of Resistance, and perhaps one of the most well-armed and well-organized paramilitary groups in the world.

But after twice battling Israel to ceasefires, Hezbollah's decision to open a second front against Israel by intervening just a day after Hamas' surprise attack drew an especially fierce retaliation. While the group suffered sizable personnel losses, the most dramatic operations came in the form of a series of bombings that struck communications devices used by members in September 2024, and the assassination of longtime Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in an airstrike shortly afterward.

By November of that year, the group opted to sign a truce with Israel that would see both sides withdraw forces from southern Lebanon. Yet today both parties remain active near the Israel-Lebanon border and continue to accuse one another of violating the ceasefire terms, with Israel continuing to conduct strikes across the neighboring nation on a semiregular basis and calling for Hezbollah's total disarmament.

"Israel is determined to finish off Hezbollah as a military organization, so it's independent of what may or may not happen in Iran and the Israelis made it very clear that they will not live with Hezbollah as a military organization," Hilal Khashan, professor at the American University of Beirut, told Newsweek.

At the same time, he said "Hezbollah refuses to disarm," as doing so would render them "indistinguishable in Lebanese politics," where the group represents one of many competing parties, most of them along sectarian lines, and even competes within its own camp with the fellow Shiite Muslim Amal Movement.

Khashan also noted that Shiite Muslims, who make up around a third—and likely a plurality—of the country also home to a similar share of Sunni Muslims and Christians, also represent a proportionate percentage of the Lebanese Army. While the military is a non-sectarian institution, he argued that any attempt by Lebanese troops to disarm Hezbollah could result in the fragmentation of the armed forces and return to civil war.

The only path forward he saw for the Lebanese Army to play a substantial role would be as peacekeepers in the event of a new large-scale Israeli intervention, the likes of which reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is currently planning. Should such an operation commence, he felt it unlikely that Tehran would be in a position to come to its ally's aid.

"I don't think Iran will be a factor, even in the event that the U.S. decides against threatening Iran, an Israeli attack on Hezbollah is most unlikely to invite a direct Iranian intervention," Khashan said. "I think even if the regime survives the current wave of protest, I think they will focus on their domestic affairs."

Yet despite Hezbollah's battlefield woes, the group is widely assessed, including by Israeli officials, to retain substantial military capabilities, including a wealth of small arms, rocket launchers, drones and precision-guided missiles that could be mobilized with or without Iranian support.

"Iran could (and has previously) sent military advisors to Lebanon to assist Hezbollah in military planning, and they can likely always find room to continue to do this if Israel were to launch another full-scale war on Lebanon, even if Iran was in a state of domestic turmoil," Lebanese journalist and analyst Ali Rizk told Newsweek. "Even in the absence of Iranian advisors, I think Hezbollah still has the brains within its ranks to put up a strong fight."

"If the U.S. decides to attack Iran what would happen depends a lot on the nature of American intervention. If Washington pursues regime change in Iran Hezbollah may initiate some kind of action to prevent the collapse of the Iranian leadership, given the special sacred ties between this leadership and Hezbollah, and the fact that toppling the Iranian state would be an existential threat to Hezbollah," Rizk added. "This could very well include action against Israel."

And since the fall of Assad in December 2024, this existential threat also emanates from Syria in the eyes of Hezbollah and many of its supporters given the Sunni Islamist background of President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whose Hayat Tahrir al-Sham faction—formerly the Nusra Front—clashed with the Lebanese group throughout Syria's own civil war. The new reality further complicates questions over Hezbollah's arsenal.

"Security in such a perceived threat environment is a more pressing priority than economic livelihood," Rizk said. "The issue of Hezbollah's weapons hence includes an important sectarian dimension with Shiites happening to be the single largest religious sect in Lebanon, which makes the issue that much more complicated."

Newsweek has reached out to a representative of Hezbollah for comment.

Yemen's Ansar Allah fighters man machine guns mounted on trucks as they participate in a protest against the U.S. and Israel on November 6, 2025, in Sanaa.

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Ansar Allah in the Spotlight

With Hezbollah suffering the brunt of Israel's campaigns, Ansar Allah, widely known as the Houthi movement, has emerged as the new top contender for most powerful non-state faction of the Axis of Resistance. The group has also demonstrated the capability to wage long-range warfare against targets at land, air and sea that rivals even conventional standing armies.

Rooted in a 1990s religious movement representing Yemen's Zaidi Shiite Muslim community, which constitutes more than a third of the country, the group launched an insurgency against the government after the killing of its leader, Hussein al-Houthi, at the hands of security forces in 2004. A decade later, amid civil war, the group, led by Houthi's son, Abdul-Malek, seized the capital Sanaa, establishing a rival government that presides over around a third of the country and 80 percent of its population.

The conflict has largely been frozen since Ansar Allah reached a U.N.-backed truce with Yemen's Saudi-backed internationally government in April 2022. After the outbreak of the war in Gaza the following year, however, Ansar Allah began launching strikes at Israel as well as commercial vessels, at one point effectively cutting trade through the Red Sea and Suez Canal by two thirds.

The campaign drew U.S. and Israeli strikes that are believed to have dealt considerable damage to the group's capabilities as well as command and control, though its chief and heads of the Ansar Allah-backed government have evaded the same fate as Nasrallah and Hamas leaders. The U.S. paused attacks on Ansar Allah after a truce signed in May of last year and the group halted its strikes on Israel and trade vessels following the Gaza ceasefire reached in September.

Farea al-Muslimi, research fellow at the Chatham House's Middle East and North Africa Program, said the U.S. strikes in particular, "really did harm to the Houthis," disrupting capabilities and communications, yet the "huge shock was in the matter of the significance of the entire idea of the Axis of Resistance," which had previously been thought of as "untouchable."

"That perception is already weakened," Muslimi told Newsweek. "So, in that sense, there is no damage control the Houthis can really do."

Yet the battlefield situation is different for a group already known to command a greater degree of independence from Iran than some other Axis of Resistance members, both in ideology and operations. He noted that "in a matter of military technicalities, I have no doubt that they basically, by now, are standing on their own feet," and that the two ceasefires established last year "definitely did buy them a lot of time to regroup, re-strategize and focus on rebuilding what they lost."

Some of this focus is now directed back toward Yemen, where one of the most sizable shifts in territorial control has occurred in recent weeks between two of Ansar Allah's top foes. After the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council suddenly seized Saudi-backed government positions, a swift counteroffensive regained lost ground and went further, leading to the dissolution of the southern separatist movement and the withdrawal of its Emirati allies from Yemen.

In some ways, Muslimi argued, the development may be a welcome one for Ansar Allah, as the "UAE is more capable in military, in anti-smuggling, in fighting, it's just fast and efficient and capable compared to the Saudis, at least in their wars with the Houthis, and they have a strong help from Israel wherever they go in the region."

That said, he also assessed that Saudi Arabia was far more prepared for a conflict today than it was when it launched its campaign in Yemen back in 2015 and, after failed diplomacy, may once again prefer a military solution.

"It's horrible to say, but I don't think we've seen the final round of war, not yet," Muslimi said. "We're in Lebanon 1989."

As for Ansar Allah's view, a source within the group recently expressed to Newsweek its assurance in its ability to fend off any looming enemy action.

"This is because we rely on God and trust in him, and we are confident that he will grant us a great victory beyond anyone's imagination," the Ansar Allah source said. "These are firm promises in the Holy Quran, which we believe in and trust completely. We have prepared ourselves in every way for the coming battle with great care and determination, also in accordance with God's instructions in the Quran regarding preparation and readiness."

"We are completely confident in achieving a historic victory, God willing," the source continued. "We have no worries or doubts about our ability, relying on God and trusting in him, to confront any new aggression, and even to achieve a great historical victory."

Kataeb Sayyed al-Shuhada members attend a funeral for one of their own killed in airstrikes in Iran, in Baghdad on June 22, 2025.

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Iraq at the Crossroads

While both Hezbollah and Ansar Allah operate at a geographical distance from Iran, the stakes may be highest of all for the Islamic Republic's allies in neighboring Iraq.

The fellow majority-Shiite Muslim nation hosts an array of militias active in the open since the U.S.-led invasion that toppled former President Saddam Hussein in 2003. For years, these forces battled both U.S. troops and jihadi Sunni Muslim insurgents, including Al-Qaeda, before the emergence of ISIS as a major common threat for Washington, Tehran and what would become the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Established in 2014 in response to ISIS' lightning gains in Iraq, the PMF is a coalition of militias that includes powerful factions such as Kataib Hezbollah, the Nujaba Movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataeb Sayyed al-Shuhada, each with their own influential leaders. The paramilitary alliance officially began integration into the Iraqi Armed Forces in 2017, yet many groups retain substantial independence and varying degrees of direct ties to Iran.

With the defeat of ISIS, a number of Iraqi militias have launched strikes at U.S. troops, particularly during periods of heightened tensions between Washington and Tehran, such as a cycle of violence in 2019 that ultimately led to the U.S. killing of IRGC Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani and PMF deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in Baghdad in 2020. Hostilities renewed in the wake of the war in Gaza, with militias operating under the collective banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting Israel as well as U.S. troops in both Iraq and Syria.

The situation has proved a test for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who has sought to balance between the U.S. and Iran while reining in armed groups acting outside the authority of the state. With militias largely halting operations against U.S. troops in February 2024 and suspending attack on Israel following the first Gaza ceasefire reached in January 2025, Iraq has thus far evaded any major conflict despite the soaring regional tensions.

As Iran now shift priorities toward the survival of the state, the value of its alliances in Iraq may grow substantially, and with it the autonomy and influence of its partners across the border.

"Should Iran’s internal difficulties cause its focus to shift inward, its Iraqi allies in the PMF and the government could become even more crucial as fallbacks," Sajad Jiyad, fellow at the Century Foundation, told Newsweek. "However, these allies are likely to seek greater independence to promote their own political and economic aims within Iraq. This situation poses a dilemma for U.S. and Iraqi leaders aiming to bolster state sovereignty."

"While integrating militias into official structures was intended to dissolve them, it may instead reinforce them as hybrid power centers," Jiyad said. "Although their cross-border activities may decrease, their influence over Iraqi institutions could grow if Iran is preoccupied with internal issues."

Yet he also said such conditions may serve to incentivize external intervention, arguing that "there is a real chance that the U.S. or Israel could take direct action against Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba in both stable and unstable situations in Iran."

"If Iran ends the current protests and restores order, any U.S. or Israeli strikes on Iraqi militias would likely depend on whether those groups start or increase attacks," Jiyad said. "If Iran’s government becomes weakened or distracted, the U.S. and Israel would have more freedom to act. In both scenarios, the basic conditions for strikes on Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and similar groups are already in place."

Such a move could usher in significant blowback. Iraq is currently in the process of forming a new government following elections last November and "the U.S. and Israel must consider whether strikes could empower hardliners or disrupt coalition talks, possibly resulting in a more hostile Baghdad government," Jiyad said.

And while some Iraqi militias have already begun to announce their willingness to respond to any U.S. attack on Iran, there are also signs that their own domestic interests may come first at a time when Iraq's stabilization was bringing with it new opportunities for economic prosperity after decades of near-constant conflict and turmoil.

Mansour, the Chatham House Iraq Initiative director, argued that "there is a minority of militias that are true to their word of Axis of Resistance, and want to fight against Israel, but they're the outliers, and they are on the fringes, and actually are being told by the other groups in Iraq to calm down and to not fight."

Increasingly, he argued, this mentality appears to be gaining momentum across the scope of the Axis of Resistance.

"I wouldn't only look at these groups as mere proxies of Iran," Mansour said. "They have their own interests, and insofar as Iran was giving them what they needed, they were obviously very happy, but the minute Iran starts to seem weak or unable to deliver, they look for other ways to find means, because these aren't Iranian groups, these are Yemeni, Iraqi, Lebanese groups, and I think that's often missed in the bigger narrative of who these groups are."

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