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By Jesus Mesa
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Bruce Schneier, the security technologist who coined the term "security theater" to describe the methods used by airport security to provide the appearance of safety, says the Transportation Security Administration's decision to end its two-decade-old shoe removal rule confirms what critics have long argued — that the policy never made air travel more secure.
"This was a security measure that addressed one specific attack from decades ago, but didn't actually make anyone safer," Schneier told Newsweek. "Tactics change. The plastic explosives are just as dangerous now, the risk is the same. Which, to me, suggests it never made sense in the first place."
On Tuesday, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem officially announced that travelers will no longer be required to remove their shoes at TSA checkpoints, ending a rule imposed after the 2001 attempted bombing by Richard Reid, the so-called "shoe bomber" who brought explosives concealed in his sneakers onto a Miami flight but was subdued by flight attendants and fellow passengers before he could ignite them.
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Noem credited improved technology and layered screening for enabling the change, calling it a step toward a better "customer experience."
A history of 'security theater'
For Schneier, a longtime critic of the TSA's procedures, the shoe policy exemplified what he has long described as "security theater," measures that inconvenience travelers and create the illusion of safety without actually reducing risk.
"I'm pretty sure it didn't actually catch anybody," he said. "If you search people's shoes, they'll just put the bomb somewhere else, like in another piece of clothing."
Schneier's critique goes beyond the much-hated shoe policy. Over the years, he has written essays, blog posts and books dissecting post-9/11 security measures that, in his view, waste billions while failing to stop attacks. After the TSA implemented a ban on liquids in containers larger than 3 ounces, he dismissed the rule as "bullshit" and emblematic of a system "built on punishment and fear as opposed to our best interest."
He has also pointed to tests by Homeland Security's own Red Team — undercover agents tasked with smuggling banned items past screeners — which revealed a failure rate of more than 95 percent, a result he called "embarrassingly high."

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The Government Accountability Office has also found little evidence that TSA programs, such as the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, effectively identify threats. Independent analyses estimate the TSA's screening measures cost around $15 million per life saved — and in some assessments, as much as $667 million — far beyond what public safety programs typically consider acceptable.
Vox reported in 2016 that only 0.6 percent of TSA SPOT flaggings led to arrests — and none of those were terrorism-related.
Schneier also spoke to Newsweek about how the experience of flying has changed since 2001. "People got scared," he said. "I've been flying before and after 9/11, and yes — it slowed everything down."
Three more rules that can go
Schneier argues that the end of the "shoes off" rule should be just the beginning of a ground-up restructuring of how the TSA operates. Among the measures he believes should be eliminated are the liquids ban, which he calls arbitrary and unproven; the use of full-body scanners, which he says are invasive and ineffective; and the SPOT behavioral screening program, which the GAO has criticized for lacking evidence of effectiveness.
"These rules create the illusion of security but don't reduce the risk," he said. "They waste billions and inconvenience millions. Focusing on specific threats like shoe bombs or snow-globe bombs simply induces the bad guys to do something else."
Even though Schneier remains sharply critical of many TSA practices, he does see value in TSA PreCheck, which allows approved travelers to skip certain steps and move through dedicated lanes.
"For me personally, it's fine because I have PreCheck and all the things that get you through faster," he said. "The main benefit is that the people in line are experienced travelers. That's more important than the rules themselves."
Reflecting on the broader lessons from more than two decades of heightened airport security, he added: "What actually makes planes safer is reinforcing cockpit doors and persuading passengers they need to fight back. Everything beyond that isn't worth it."

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