U.S. President Donald Trump speaks in front of a map of Trump’s proposed “Golden Dome” missile defense system

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David Averre

By David Averre

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The President of the United States has misled the American people on many counts: he said he’d end wars, bring down prices, and pay down the national debt, and at the time of writing, none of those things have happened. But there’s one thing on which he’s remained consistent as long as anyone can remember.

"Donald Trump really hates nuclear weapons; that’s been clear since the 1980s," Rose Gottemoeller, former deputy secretary-general of NATO and the U.S. chief negotiator for the New START nuclear treaty with Russia, told Newsweek. "Back when he was a real estate magnate, he made it clear he wanted to take on the assignment of an arms control negotiator."

Days before New START expired earlier this year and left Moscow and Washington with no binding limits on their nuclear arsenals, Trump announced: "We’ll just do a better agreement." This time, though, he wants China in on the deal.

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On Wednesday, the U.S. president met his counterparts from Moscow and Beijing at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen. On Thursday, he'll finally have the chance to sell Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on his plans for nuclear disarmament. But, if it’s a new grand bargain Trump is after, he will be sorely disappointed.

The world is no longer split between two poles of power, nuclear or otherwise, and the inclusion of China creates a collision between three sets of contradictory goals and concerns.

Newsweek interviewed veteran negotiators and arms control analysts to explore the views from Washington, Beijing and Moscow, and to assess what—if anything—Trump might be able to achieve.

First Things First

Before any talks can begin, the three parties must decide on what is actually up for discussion in the first place.

White House spokesperson Olivia Wales has said the president wants to "reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world." The administration's top arms-control official, Thomas DiNanno, aims to "prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, limit the build-up of nuclear arms, and restore responsible behavior."

Trump himself on Monday floated the idea of everyone getting rid of their weapons altogether, a prospect not even he could actually believe.

But whatever the case, Trump is clearly trying to put the ball in the eastern side of the court; there’s just no guarantee that it’ll be hit back.

Donald Trump (L) and Vladimir Putin (R) shake hands by Xi Jinping before a formal reception in honor of the APEC leaders in Shenzhen.

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Beijing has officially described Thursday's meeting as being "of groundbreaking significance" for world peace and strategic stability, but tellingly left out any mention of nuclear arms control. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, meanwhile, said Tuesday that arms control urgently needed high-level discussion, yet omitted any suggestion that such a discussion would actually kick off in Shenzhen.

In short, all three leaders claim they want to solve their issues through dialogue and diplomacy, but two out of three are reluctant to enter into either—with very good reason.

Can't We All Just Get Along?

The last attempt at controlling the world's largest nuclear arsenals was hard enough, and that had only two parties.

Signed in 2010 after months of negotiations led by Gottemoeller, New START imposed strict limits on the number of strategic warheads both Russia and the U.S. could deploy. It granted each side permission to carry out up to 18 short-notice inspections of the other’s nuclear facilities each year. The program was derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the treaty ultimately expired in February.

For the Russians, this bilateral arrangement was about as good as it gets. "New START was the ideal; it was a very good treaty," retired lieutenant general and former head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s International Treaty Directorate, Evgeny Buzhinsky, told Newsweek. "Transparency and predictability are much better than the gray zone."

Therein lies the first of many Russian grievances. Entering a multilateral arms control agreement with anyone other than the White House would force the Kremlin into an asymmetrical obligation with less-developed nuclear powers.

"The U.S. and Russia control the overwhelming majority of the global nuclear arsenal. Yes, the Chinese are increasing the number of their nuclear warheads, but they are lagging behind greatly," Buzhinsky said. "Arms control, especially nuclear arms control, should be an agreement between equals. If Trump wants China involved, then Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan should be involved."

That constitutes the second problem for Moscow. Russia needs its nuclear arsenal to deter Washington—and Britain and France, according to the Kremlin—but it has no quarrel with Beijing.

"For Russia, it's the United States, U.K. and France. For the United States, it's Russia, China. For China, it's India and the U.S. In multinational arms control, each country has its own subject or object of deterrence," Buzhinsky said.

"If we inspect Britain’s three-and-a-half nuclear submarines, do they get to inspect our entire arsenal? That won’t do."

Compared with Russia, China’s objections to a trilateral arms control treaty are far less complex. As far as Beijing is concerned, such a deal is "not fair, reasonable, or realistic" while Russian and American arsenals dwarf that of the PRC. In effect, either Moscow and Washington must cut down their numbers, or wait for Beijing to reach theirs.

In the meantime, Xi is staking a claim to something neither Russia nor America can. "China is always going to be fighting to achieve and hold the moral high ground," Dr. Nicolò Fasola, senior associate at the RAND Europe think tank, told Newsweek. He pointed out that China’s nuclear doctrine maintains a no-first-use policy. "By hosting this meeting of three great powers, nuclear and in general, the Chinese are affirming their role in international relations as a responsible great power, which is very important to them."

Washington, meanwhile, faces a different calculation. The Pentagon's 2026 National Defense Strategy warns of a "simultaneity problem"—the possibility that America's adversaries could act together across multiple theaters. Fasola said this concern over "adversarial alignment" very much extends to the nuclear realm, given that Beijing and Moscow are not engaged in mutual deterrence.

China's DF-5C nuclear capable missiles are seen on trucks at a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Tiananmen Square on September 3, 2025, in Beijing, China.

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Even if any of these gargantuan obstacles can be navigated, there’s also the question of what weapons should even be covered in a future arms control agreement. For example, Moscow and Beijing have jointly condemned Trump's Golden Dome missile defense project as a threat to strategic stability. Gottemoeller expects both countries to make it an issue in any future negotiation.

For these reasons and many more besides, finding a compromise to satisfy all three parties seems like an insurmountable task. But the godmother of American nuclear policy has a few ideas about where to begin.

Nothing Is Impossible

Drawing on decades of experience in arms control negotiations, Gottemoeller suggested a practical approach to the intractable problem that sounds well suited to a president whose approach to foreign policy and diplomacy resembles the behavior of a hostile corporate executive.

"The president being the president, he'll want some kind of grand gesture, and I've been thinking the word framework," Gottemoeller said. "The president perhaps could agree with Putin and Xi for some kind of broad framework that commits the three countries to pursue disarmament talks as members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but sets no numerical ceilings or timetables for disarmament.

"The Chinese have been quite unwilling to talk about nuclear controls of any kind, so to have their president at the highest level commit to work with the Russians and the Americans on further nuclear stability would by itself be a very positive step."

Striking an agreement in principle, however loose, would lay the foundation for technical work to begin on two separate tracks. Washington and Moscow could leverage their shared history to explore a revival of New START with inspections, warhead limits and data exchanges. A separate U.S.-China conversation could begin with the basics: transparency and risk reduction measures rather than imposing hard limits.

"With the Chinese, we have a different conversation because it's at a much different point in their weapon modernization," Gottemoeller said. "At the end of the day, there would be two different kinds of practical agreements, but they could come under this grand framework."

That approach would also revive an old diplomatic habit: keeping nuclear talks alive even when everything else is going wrong. Gottemoeller said that Washington and Moscow managed to seal the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement in 1972, even as the Soviets were backing the North Vietnamese against American forces.

But, for a chance of realizing any returns, the Trump administration must go by the book. "This is not something that Kushner and Witkoff can just achieve by themselves with no technical expertise on the delegation. It just doesn't work," Gottemoeller said.

"I'm involved in a lot of track two talks (informal, nongovernmental discussions) with both the Russians and the Chinese, and I know there are good scientific experts as well as those like me, former diplomats out there who would be ready to lend their expertise.

"But I always say that it is the people who are the weapons systems operators who are the most important—bomber pilots, submarine weapons experts. They are natural negotiators who speak the same technical language."

U.S. chief negotiator Rose Gottemoeller (R) and director of the department for disarmament of the Russian Foreign Ministry Anatoly Antonov shake hands during a press conference on cutting nuclear arsenals on April 24, 2009 at the U.S. Embassy in Rome.

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Fasola added that, for Trump, returning from Shenzhen with at least a positive joint statement by all three leaders would constitute a personal win that might also strike a chord with a disgruntled electorate.

"I think the renewed emphasis by Trump on this sort of grand bargain stems directly from the defeat (the Republican Party) suffered at the midterm elections, and to make up for his other foreign political mistakes beginning from the Iran war," Fasola told Newsweek.

"Consider the polls released earlier this year that found 91 percent (of registered voters) were very much in favor of an extension of the New START treaty and a renegotiation of it. So we might assume that a vast proportion of the American people is going to be in favor of achieving greater strategic stability."

The three governments are already working on a joint communiqué for Thursday's meeting, though the Kremlin says the leaders may issue separate statements if they fail to agree on a common sentiment.

It might not sound like much, but if Trump returns from Shenzhen with little besides a few carefully massaged sentences about nuclear stability and arms control on which everyone can agree, the trip should be considered a success. Several intricate and potentially armageddon-averting agreements between deeply mistrusting nuclear-armed powers have previously sprouted from similarly humble beginnings.

Those sentences, and the potential they carry, might prove to be sturdy stones in the future monument to his presidential legacy.

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