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By Joseph Epstein
Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute
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The Middle East punishes every American president who engages with it, yet every proposal to leave ends with Iran controlling the Persian Gulf and, with it, a third of the world's oil supply. This year showed what that would mean. A regime with its air defenses destroyed and its leadership decimated still choked off a fifth of the world's oil at the Strait of Hormuz. The United States pumps 40 percent more oil than Saudi Arabia, but gasoline rose from $2.98 on February 28, the day the war with Iran began, to more than $4 for four straight months.
Republicans paid for those prices on November 3. Vice President JD Vance wrote the next morning that "the reason we lost is the war," and added that defecting Trump voters wanted a changed relationship with Israel. That gives the region too much credit. Immigration, inflation and the ordinary midterm penalty all counted, and President Donald Trump told "60 Minutes" only that voters "didn't like the war" or the gas prices that came with it. The closer precedent is 1974. The Arab oil embargo had quadrupled the price of crude the previous winter, and the inflation that followed joined Watergate in costing Republicans 48 House seats. In both years, the Middle East reached American voters through the pump.
Many in both parties want to leave the region alone and turn to China. Yet the region holds roughly half the world's proven oil reserves and a large share of its traded fertilizer, and the green transition meant to make them irrelevant is decades away. As Walter Russell Mead noted in The Wall Street Journal earlier this month, shale has not freed America from the Gulf because any disruption there still moves prices everywhere. The region's crises also travel. Syria's civil war sent more than a million refugees into Europe and reordered the continent's politics, and the jihadism bred in its wars has struck New York, Paris and Moscow.
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That leaves two options. The first is a bargain with Tehran followed by withdrawal. Barack Obama told The Atlantic in 2016 that Saudi Arabia and Iran needed to "share the neighborhood." Joe Biden returned to that approach, and the restraint wing of the Republican Party, with Vance as its most prominent voice, now offers its own version. In practice, sharing means ceding. Iran, a partner of China and Russia, would hold a veto over a third of the world's oil. This year's crisis offered a sample of what that veto is worth.

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The administration never made that case. It sold the war on Iran's nuclear program, on the evil of the regime and on promises that kept moving: a campaign of four to five weeks, then a say in who would rule Iran afterward. Even the nuclear argument was undersold. An Iranian bomb would multiply Tehran's power without ever being used, because it would place the regime beyond retaliation. Russia's arsenal is the reason Western governments ration every weapon they send to Ukraine.
Iran was approaching the same immunity by conventional means. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that Tehran was producing more than 100 ballistic missiles a month, against six or seven American THAAD interceptors. At that pace, Iran was headed for overmatch, the point at which its missiles and drones could saturate any defense in the region and hold every Gulf oil terminal, American base and Israeli city at risk. A regime with that capability could close Hormuz whenever it chose. This year's gas prices were a preview of the leverage that a government which has chanted "Death to America" for nearly five decades would have held permanently. Trump chose to confront that threat himself instead of leaving it to a successor. His administration never explained it to Americans paying at the pump.
Earlier presidents understood the stakes. Franklin Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy in February 1945, and Harry Truman followed in 1950 with a written pledge to defend the kingdom. That bargain kept Gulf oil in the Western camp throughout the Cold War, and in 1985 it gave Washington a partner willing to flood the market and help break Soviet finances.
Policy since has lurched between extremes. George W. Bush invaded Iraq over the private warnings of Saudi and Israeli leaders, including Ariel Sharon, who told him that Iran was the greater danger, and removed Tehran's chief rival. Obama swung toward accommodation with Iran and alienated the allies living next to it. Trump's first term built a coalition through the Abraham Accords, Biden reverted to Obama's approach, and Trump's second term has been engaged yet pulled apart by its own factions. Allies and adversaries have learned that American commitments expire every four years.
The second option is a coalition of Israel, the Gulf states and other partners strong enough to balance Iran, with the United States underwriting its security. That takes fewer troops than an occupation and more commitment than a withdrawal. The Abraham Accords showed that such a coalition can be built. It will hold only if its members believe that America will still be there after the next election.
Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
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