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Christopher Dickey

By Christopher Dickey

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The machines were rusting, the laboratory equipment broken or missing, the offices empty. The Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory, which used to brew quantities of deadly Botulinum toxin, was among the United Nations inspectors' first stops when they fanned out last week in search of Saddam Hussein's secret weapons. And the plant's former director, Mantasser Omar Abdel-Aziz, exulted in its emptiness. "Nobody can do anything here," he said, inviting reporters to tour the defunct facility.

No sign of weapons, so no need for the Bush administration to make good on its threat of war to disarm Iraq. "It is very good cooperation," said Abdel-Aziz.

But as the United States continues deploying its combat-ready forces to the region, there's very little hope--or expectation--that sort of cooperation will last. And there is a widespread belief among Western intelligence and diplomatic sources that the showdown will come soon, when inspectors shift their focus away from meticulously abandoned factories to go after not just hardware or weapons or even "presidential sites," but the human factor: the brains behind the weapons. That's when Saddam is most likely to balk, according to U.S. and other intelligence sources, thus triggering war. "The real disarmament is removing the people who can reconstitute the programs," explains Khidir Hamza, formerly a leading nuclear scientist in Iraq and .who is now in exile. "What he cannot replace is a scientist who leaves." And Saddam knows it. "The fear is that if [the United Nations] asks them out, they are all going to defect," Hamza told NEWSWEEK.

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Already there are unconfirmed reports that some scientists or their families are interned in special camps. The reputed founder of Iraq's bioweapons program, Abdul Nasser Hindawi, was jailed in 1998 for allegedly trying to defect. And the most famous of all, the woman known as Dr. Germ, Rihab Taha, is supposed to have retired. But the human shell game Saddam has played with his scientists in the past is his most complex gambit. Former inspectors know he created a complex web of lies and fictional relationships to deceive them.

For the moment, inspection chief Hans Blix is handling the human factor as delicately as possible. Paragraph 5 of the U.N. resolution specifically orders Saddam to give the inspectors "immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons [they] wish to interview in the mode or location of [their] choice." The resolution says inspectors can conduct those interviews outside Iraq, and they're explicitly authorized to help the people they want to question--and their families--to leave the country. Blix downplayed such possibilities in an interview with CNN last week. "What if the Iraqis stop it? We cannot force it," he said. "We are not an army." But the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers beginning to assemble on Iraq's periphery certainly are.

The biological-weapons program has always been Saddam's most closely guarded secret. Germs like anthrax and smallpox, and toxins such as Botulinum, provide the perfect portable weapons of mass destruction--just the kinds of devices the Bush administration fears could be given to terrorists. Iraq has admitted to having produced 30 tons of germs and toxins that it never turned over to the United Nations. One key figure in the program and a potential source of vital information, even if she is sitting at home today, is Taha. A stern-faced 46-year-old microbiologist with salt-and-pepper hair, she's remembered as a less-than-brilliant student by her professors at the British university where she did graduate work. But Taha has achieved a kind of mythical status in the reams of literature written about Saddam's weapons. Inspectors called her Dr. Germ. Fleet Street has dubbed her Dr. Death, even Toxic Taha.

"I first met her in New York in late 1992 or early 1993," says Rolf Ekeus, who headed the U.N. inspection effort until 1997. Several Iraqi officials had been invited to explain their research efforts, and Taha was among them. "She was very, very smart," Ekeus recalls. "She made a big show on a blackboard of how much she could have produced with what she had, and it was only a few grams."

So persuasive was Taha, in fact, and so thin was the available evidence, that Ekeus says he was "quite skeptical about the existence of a biological program." Then the U.N. scientists crunched Taha's numbers, and confronted her with their findings at the next meeting in Baghdad. "She made a big scene, crying and slamming down her fists and running out the door and slamming it," the courtly Swedish diplomat recalls. "The other Iraqis looked at us like we were not gentlemen."

One inspector in particular was sure that Taha was lying. A French lawyer named Annick Paul-Henriot had come onboard in late 1993. "She was fantastic," Ekeus remembers. "Annick was insistent. She gave me no peace." Though not a scientist, Paul-Henriot organized some of the best, among them former U.S. Army bioweapons expert Richard Spertzel as chief biologist. They developed a methodical program to expose Taha's lies.

The key was "growth media," much the same as agar used in the petri dishes of a high-school biology class. Placed in fermenters with a culture of anthrax, it can be used to create massive quantities of one of the deadliest substances on earth. Israeli intelligence had provided specific data on how much Iraq had acquired, and Paul-Henriot insisted every bit of it be accounted for. The invoices provided by Iraq's Health Ministry were at least 10 times the actual need for hospitals and conventional labs. But when Ekeus confronted Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz over the issue, Aziz smoothly suggested an inept civil servant had made the mistake of ordering too much. "Annick understood they were hiding something," said Ekeus, and she kept up the pressure. But the hard-driving Frenchwoman wore a pacemaker and was in much more fragile health than any of her colleagues realized. "She died suddenly," said Ekeus. "It was a terrible shock."

By then, however, Paul-Henriot's team was dogging Taha's steps. Another inspector, a German bioweapons expert named Gabrielle Kraatz-Wadsack, toured the seven-square-kilometer Al Hakam facility south of Baghdad where Taha was supposed to be in charge. The ostensible purpose of the plant was to grow single-cell proteins as additives for chicken feed. Kraatz-Wadsack spotted only three chickens (where there ought to have been hundreds), noticed military guards and a double-thick fence, realized that the fermenters were much too small for their supposed purpose--and concluded that the facility would be just perfect for growing biological weapons.

In April 1995, Ekeus reported to the U.N. Security Council that Iraq had developed a biological-weapons program. In August 1995, Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamel, who oversaw all of Iraq's weapons programs, suddenly defected to Jordan. Over the next several weeks, until Kamel made the fatal mistake of returning to Iraq, inspectors debriefed him extensively. Now they had all the proof they needed that the weapons program existed.

Kraatz-Wadsack visited Al Hakam again and listened as Taha, this time, explained matter-of-factly how she had supervised the production of more than 8,000 liters (2,000 gallons) of anthrax spores, and 19,000 liters (9,500 gallons) of Botulinum toxin for the Iraqi weapons program--enough deadly germs to kill millions of people. "It was a strange feeling when she was admitting she did all the production," recalled Kraatz-Wadsack. "She was smiling, a nice person. You had the sense she was proud that she had done what no one imagined she could do. She was just as pleasant telling us how she did all this, where things were stored, as she was when she was lying to us about the single-cell proteins."

But is Rihab Taha the banal genius of evil behind the biological-weapons program? Or was there someone else? Former inspectors interviewed by NEWSWEEK said they thought she was a front. "I always had the impression we never met the person who was really in charge," said chief biologist Spertzel. No inspector was sure who that was--or is. But they look to Taha's superiors and most intimate colleagues as possible candidates.

One is Abdul Nasser Hindawi, who may have recruited Taha even before she was sent to England to study in 1979. Hindawi supposedly authored a paper that persuaded Saddam to invest heavily in bioweapons development. Among his arguments: the relatively low cost of wiping out Israel. Although Hindawi's information would not be up to date (he was jailed four years ago), he could be a source of vital history if inspectors can find him, and if he is still alive.

Spertzel thinks another scientist may be very important now. Huda Amash, dean of the University of Baghdad's College of Science, is the only female named to the inner circle of Saddam's political elite, the Revolutionary Command Council. Former inspectors vividly remember trying to chase her down in 1997. Amash was "never where she was supposed to be," says Spertzel. During one visit to the College of Science, an inspector spotted a "student" dressed in lab coat and goggles who looked suspiciously like Amash--and was. After an extensive search of the lab, the inspectors found equipment and reagents that Amash had brought back from her travels abroad.

The man who headed the virus program in 1990, Hazem Ali, may also be of central importance now, says Spertzel. In March 1997, Ali left his position at the Razi Research Institute. He said he was taking a position as an instructor at Baghdad University's College of Veterinary Medicine, but when inspectors went to interview him there, employees at one point said he wasn't on the faculty, Spertzel recalls. Then the Iraqi government told inspectors that Ali had taken a teaching post at the university's College of Medicine. Another lie.

Other suspected masterminds may be hiding in plain sight. A key supervisor of Taha's at one point was Amer Saadi, a London University-trained engineer who later rose to become a major general and head of the Military Industrialization Commission, which oversees all of Iraq's weapons programs. Saadi is now one of the senior Iraqi officials in charge of relations with U.N. weapons inspectors.

In 1993, the head of the MIC was Gen. Amer Rashid, who led the delegation to New York that included Taha. Although married with a 6-year-old son at the time, Rashid began an affair with Dr. Germ while at the United Nations for meetings with Ekeus. Taha became pregnant, and when her daughter Huda was born in 1994, the couple married. Rashid went on to become Iraq's minister of Oil, and may also have been in charge of weapons of mass destruction. He's another prime target for interrogation.

As for Taha herself, Spertzel believes she's a full-time housewife these days. Or is she? "You wouldn't want to make her mad," says Ekeus, the former inspection chief. "With this wife, you would want to be cautious with your morning coffee. She has all the poisons at her disposal." As does Saddam, for the moment.

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