In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian hold a meeting in Ashgabat on December 12, 2025. (Photo by Alexander KAZAKOV / POOL / AFP via Getty Images)

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Joseph Epstein

By Joseph Epstein

Director of the Turan Research Center and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute

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Russia and Iran were supposed to be strategic partners. They signed a comprehensive partnership treaty last year, pledging deeper defense cooperation and economic integration. When the United States struck Iran, some predicted Russia would stand by its ally. Instead, Moscow has treated Tehran's war as a business opportunity—pocketing oil windfalls, leveraging Western desperation for energy and bleeding U.S. military resources through covert intelligence sharing, all while risking nothing of its own.

By every short-term measure, Russia is winning a war it is not fighting. But the Middle East that Russia spent two decades inserting itself into is being reshaped by forces Moscow can neither direct nor contain, and the long-term costs may outweigh the dividends.

Before the war on Iran began, Russia was earning roughly $135 million a day from oil exports. Today, with the Strait of Hormuz functionally closed and Middle Eastern supply in chaos, that figure has doubled to approximately $270 million. Brent crude has surged past $115 a barrel. Washington, under pressure to stabilize oil prices, issued a 30-day sanctions waiver allowing countries to purchase roughly 128 million barrels of Russian crude stranded on tankers—the same sanctions regime designed to starve the Kremlin's war machine in Ukraine. Putin, sensing the opening, publicly offered to resume oil and gas deliveries to Europe on the condition that European buyers commit to long-term cooperation "free from political pressure." In plain language: drop the sanctions posture and the taps reopen.

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Meanwhile, Russia has been sharing satellite intelligence with Iran, providing targeting data on U.S. troop positions and military assets in the Middle East. When Politico reported that Putin's envoy Kirill Dmitriev offered to halt this intelligence sharing if the United States stopped providing intelligence to Ukraine—a proposal the Trump administration rejected—the offer itself was more revealing than the rejection. Moscow is treating Iran's war and Ukraine's war as a single strategic ledger, looking for ways to cash in on one to gain an advantage in the other.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian hold a meeting on December 12, 2025, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

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None of this should surprise anyone who looks past the surface of the relationship. Russia and Iran are not allies—they are, as Russia's own former ambassador to Tehran, Levan Dzhagaryan, once put it, "fellow travelers." The history runs on suspicion. The 19th century Russo-Persian Wars cost Iran what is now Azerbaijan; the Treaty of Turkmenchay became a Persian byword for humiliating, imposed peace—a term Iranian officials still invoke today. After the Islamic Revolution, Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini labeled the Soviet Union the "lesser Satan.” When Russia briefly used an Iranian air base in 2016 to strike targets in Syria, domestic backlash in Tehran was so fierce that the agreement was reversed within a week. What binds Moscow and Tehran is a shared list of enemies, not a common purpose.

The war has also handed Putin a wedge he could not have manufactured on his own. Several NATO allies—Germany and Spain most prominently—have come out forcefully against the U.S.-led operation in Iran. Tehran presents a direct missile threat to European nations, funds terrorist and narcotics networks on European soil, and actively works to undermine the same Western alliance holding the line on Ukraine. For Moscow, watching NATO fracture over a U.S. campaign against one of the West's most committed adversaries is a gift.

And the diversion from Ukraine is not just political. The Patriot interceptors being consumed against Iranian targets are the same air defense systems Kyiv depends on. What gets deployed in the Middle East is unavailable in Eastern Europe. Washington's bandwidth—military, diplomatic and political—has shifted with it.

But short-term gains can obscure long-term losses. In November 2024, I argued that Russia would sell out Iran in a heartbeat. The war has proven just that: Moscow has watched Iran burn while coldly tallying its dividends. Yet what Russia is losing may prove more costly than what it is earning.

For years, Moscow built something valuable in the Middle East: the ability to shape events. In Syria, Russia positioned itself between Iran and Israel, using its S-400 missile system to control the skies and leveraging that control to extract deference from both sides. Sometimes Moscow would allow Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets; sometimes it would provide them cover. The dynamic gave Putin what he prizes above almost everything: indispensability. Both Tehran and Jerusalem had to account for Russia.

That architecture is gone. Assad fell in December 2024. Russia's Syrian foothold collapsed with him. Now Iran—the partner Moscow relied on for drones, for joint sanctions evasion, for a shared front against the West—is being systematically degraded by U.S. and Israeli strikes, and Russia can do nothing to prevent it.

What comes next depends on what emerges from the wreckage of the Islamic Republic.

If the regime survives and maintains its anti-U.S. posture, Moscow could gain a dependent client—a weakened Iran with nowhere else to turn for weapons, grain and diplomatic cover. This is the best case scenario for Putin. He does not seek true allies; he cultivates vassals. Iran operates the same way: it has no real allies—only proxy groups, transactional relationships and temporary convergences of interest. For both Moscow and Tehran, dependence is the only reliable foundation for loyalty.

But there is another scenario Moscow fears far more. If the Islamic Republic collapses, or—perhaps worse for Putin—strikes a deal with Washington, Russia loses its last significant partner along the entire arc from the Mediterranean to the Caspian. The region that Russia spent two decades carefully inserting itself into would be reshaped entirely by forces Moscow could neither direct nor contain.

Putin's flexibility—the judo principle he has long celebrated—has served him in the short term. Oil revenues are up, the U.S. is distracted and NATO is arguing with itself. But the Middle East that Russia built its influence around is burning, and Moscow is a spectator. For a country whose entire strategic identity rests on being indispensable, that may prove the most consequential loss of all.

Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center and senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

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