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By David Averre
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Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons were back in the news this week, which is exactly where the Kremlin likes them.
The culprit this time appeared to be a Bloomberg report citing sources close to the Kremlin that a growing number of Russian officials have concluded Vladimir Putin might ultimately use tactical nukes in Ukraine as a last resort, the same week that CIA Director John Ratcliffe made an unannounced visit to Moscow.
Some Russian hawks aren’t afraid to say it out loud, either. Igor Korotchenko, military analyst and editor of Russia’s National Defense magazine, recently declared Russia’s General Staff should devise a plan to cut Ukraine off from European weapons supplies using them.
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Earlier this year, ultra-hardline oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev advocated for a "20-25 kiloton strike" to end the special military operation within a month.
Terrifying stuff—until you go beyond the headlines and scary quotes. If you printed off all the evidence to suggest that Russian tactical nuclear threats are overblown, stacked that up and dropped it on Ukraine, it might cause more damage than an actual warhead.
The Boy Who Cried Nuke

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Moscow’s most useful nuclear weapon is the one it never fires, one whose yield is measured by how hesitant it makes Ukraine’s benefactors to provide more support, and the number of politicians wondering whether this particular Russian "red line" might finally be the real one.
A mammoth study, published in December 2025 by researchers at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Peace Research Center Prague, catalogued more than 400 nuclear-related statements and actions from the run-up to the full-scale invasion through January 2025.
Of 282 Russian signals, by far the largest category was what the researchers called "nuclear escalation risk signaling"—rhetoric designed to dramatize the danger of uncontrolled escalation, manipulate Western threat perceptions, and discourage the U.S. and Europe from providing more support to Ukraine.
The researchers said they even had to rewrite their methodology to refine their classification of threats because Russian nuclear rhetoric had become so "commonplace and normalized" that simply calling it escalatory stopped being useful.
Some of the foremost experts on the Russia-Ukraine war and the wider antagonism between Moscow and the West have come to similar conclusions.
In June, Orysia Lutsevych, deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia programme and head of the Ukraine forum at Chatham House, told the British parliament's House of Commons Defence Committee "we are very far away from the risk of nuclear weapons."
Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the former Commanding General of United States Army Europe and senior adviser to NATO, went further last month, telling Parliament’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy there is "almost zero chance" Russia would use nuclear weapons "in and around Ukraine," because there is no benefit.
The benefit is in the threat itself and watching the West "frankly, overreact to it."
To ensure we were giving this a fair shake, Newsweek asked Darya Dolzikova, one of the foremost experts on nuclear deterrence and a senior research fellow in RUSI's Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme.
"The prospect of Russian nuclear use is floated regularly in Russian expert and media commentary, and Russian leadership has previously used threats of nuclear use in an apparent effort to coerce Ukrainian partners away from further assisting Ukraine," she said.
"I would interpret any latest reports in that same context; I don't currently see the conditions under which the prospect of Russian nuclear use would become credible."
Stop me if you’ve heard this before.
Okay, So What Would A Real Threat Look Like?
Listening to saber-rattling from Russian officials, washed-up army types and propagandists is clearly not a good indicator of whether Moscow’s nuclear threats are legitimate.
Earlier this year, nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace George Perkovich proposed a rather more useful test.
In a January report entitled How to Assess Nuclear 'Threats' in the Twenty-First Century, he called on analysts to strip away the scary language and use simple but specific questions to assess the validity of nuclear threats, using questions like: Who made the threat? Does that person actually have nuclear authority? Is there a clear demand? Is the situation existentially threatening for the adversary?
And, crucially, is rhetoric being accompanied by unusual physical preparations that look like more than putting on a show?
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The result is a framework that distinguishes nuclear allusions and theatrical gestures from actual preparations. When applying the framework to Russian nuclear hysteria since 2022, Perkovich found that Western governments detected no corresponding preparations to actually use the weapons in almost every instance.
Except one. In September and October 2022, Russian forces were being routed around Kharkiv and Kherson, and Putin warned that he would use "all weapon systems available," insisting: "This is not a bluff."
Intercepted military communications added substance to the threat. Journalist Bob Woodward reported in his 2024 book War that intelligence agencies informed President Joe Biden there could be up to a 50 percent chance of nuclear use if Russian lines collapsed and Moscow’s control of Crimea came into doubt.
Assessing the rhetoric and physical signals according to his nuclear threat assessment framework, Perkovich concluded there was, however briefly, an urgent threat.
There is, then, a point at which "radioactive baloney" stops being funny.

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A tactical nuclear weapon is not some cute little diet nuke. The term generally describes nonstrategic shorter-range weapons intended for battlefield use, often with lower yields than strategic warheads designed to strike targets on the other side of the world.
But "lower" is doing some heroic work there—a five-kiloton weapon still releases roughly one-third the explosive energy of the Hiroshima bomb. And nonstrategic principally describes a weapon’s mission and delivery system, not a particular yield. Some tactical weapons can be more powerful than Hiroshima.
Once somebody uses one, nobody gets to control neatly what happens next.
A Healthy Dose Of Skepticism
As Perkovich reminds us, we cannot allow our very rational fear of nuclear consequences to perceive every reference to them as a genuine threat. Doing so can "weaken national or alliance resolve to defend against aggression," and cause us to lose sensitivity to when the situation calls for genuine concern.
"When threats are inflated, and the feared actions do not transpire, people may become inured and stop preparing adequately to respond when the moment is truly dire," he reasoned.
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A good example of this came in November 2024, when Russia officially updated its nuclear doctrine.
Putin broadened the circumstances in which Moscow could consider nuclear use, including a conventional attack posing a "critical threat" to Russian sovereignty or territorial integrity, while an attack by a non-nuclear state backed by a nuclear power may be treated as a "joint attack."
To Western nations steadily ramping up their provision of more advanced weaponry to Ukraine, it sounded alarming. But SWP noted that nuclear experts largely saw the changes as simply codifying behavior Russia was already displaying, rather than unveiling some radically lower threshold.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself said the update "does not add anything that the West does not know."
What’s more, each supposed red line that prompted nuclear warnings from Russia turned out to be chalk marks that were crossed, rubbed out, and simply redrawn further back.
In 2023, Lavrov warned that the move to provide Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets would be viewed as a nuclear threat because they can carry nuclear weapons. The F-16s came anyway.
That same summer, Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev said Russia would have "no other way out" but to use nuclear weapons if a NATO-backed Ukrainian offensive seized Russian territory. A year later, Ukrainian troops marched into Kursk.
Then Putin warned that allowing Ukraine to fire Western long-range weapons into Russia would mean NATO countries were "at war with Russia." Ukraine subsequently fired U.S.-supplied ATACMS, British Storm Shadow and French SCALP missiles into Russia. Moscow responded by unleashing its "Oreshnik" ballistic missile, but with a conventional warhead.

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And in June 2025, Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb went further still, attacking strategic Russian airbases and nuclear-capable bombers in a series of country-wide drone strikes. The security think tank CSIS noted that the strikes arguably satisfied one of the conditions laid out in Russia’s revised doctrine for possible nuclear use.
Atlantic Council fellow Mark Temnycky told Newsweek there are good reasons why Moscow keeps stopping short.
"Most assessments conclude a tactical weapon would be unlikely to reverse Ukraine’s military position in any lasting way," he said. "Ukrainian forces are dispersed rather than concentrated, which limits the payoff of a single strike."
There is also the inconvenient fact that Russia wants the land it is threatening to irradiate.
"A tactical strike also runs counter to Russia’s own war aims," Temnycky said. "A nuclear detonation, even a low-yield tactical weapon, would contaminate that same land for years." Ultimately, he added, "a tactical weapon’s value to Russia would be primarily psychological and coercive rather than tactical."
That does not mean Putin's nuclear arsenal can be treated like it doesn’t exist. If Russian forces suffer a catastrophic collapse in Ukraine, intelligence agencies start detecting unusual movements of warheads and Putin issues a specific ultimatum, start worrying.
But when another Russian television hawk starts fantasizing about nuking a Ukrainian railway junction, perhaps the West could resist handing him the strategic victory of panicking on command.
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