President Donald Trump walks the red carpet before the 48th Kennedy Center Honors, Sunday, Dec. 7, 2025; Federal Trade Commission commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter on Capitol Hill in Washington, Wednesday, May 8, 2019; President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the White House in Washington on Jan. 30, 1936.

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Robert Alexander

By Robert Alexander

Senior Crime & Court Reporter

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The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday began hearing a case that could give Donald Trump unprecedented influence over federal regulators by allowing presidents to fire the heads of independent agencies at will—upending a 90-year-old constraint on executive branch power.

The dispute in Trump v. Slaughter directly targets Humphrey’s Executor, the 1935 ruling that has long insulated agencies like the FTC from presidential removal.

Newsweek contacted the Department of Justice (DOJ) and administrative law scholars for comment via email outside of normal working hours on Monday.

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Why It Matters

The Supreme Court’s review of Trump v. Slaughter could reshape the federal government by reconsidering Humphrey’s Executor, the precedent that shields leaders of independent agencies from at-will removal by the president.

If the justices narrow or overturn the ruling, presidents could gain broad authority to refashion regulatory bodies such as the FTC, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), raising the likelihood of rapid policy swings and weakening guardrails meant to insulate oversight from political pressure.

The Court is also weighing whether judges may reinstate unlawfully removed officials—a separate question that could significantly limit judicial checks on presidential power.

President Donald Trump walks the red carpet before the 48th Kennedy Center Honors on December 7, 2025; Federal Trade Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter on Capitol Hill in Washington on May 8, 2019; President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the White House in Washington on January 30, 1936.

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What To Know

In the widening constitutional clash over control of the bureaucracy, Humphrey’s Executor sits at the center.

The Justice Department has told Congress it now views for-cause protections for members of multimember commissions as unconstitutional and will "urge the Supreme Court to overrule" the 1935 decision, clearing the way for presidents to remove the heads of independent agencies at will.

Trump v. Slaughter arose from Trump’s removal of Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, a Democratic FTC commissioner, earlier this year.

She was dismissed without the "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" finding required by statute.

Her challenge asks whether Congress may constitutionally shield FTC commissioners from at-will removal, as Humphrey’s Executor has long allowed.

Throughout 2025, the Court has repeatedly permitted Trump to remove officials at other independent agencies, including the NLRB and the Merit Systems Protection Board.

In Trump v. Wilcox, the Court stayed orders reinstating two removed members, concluding that "the Government is likely to show that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive power" and that the president therefore "may remove without cause executive officers who exercise that power on his behalf."

What Humphrey’s Executor Held

The Court’s 1935 decision involved President Franklin Roosevelt’s attempt to remove FTC commissioner William E. Humphrey, who resisted New Deal policies.

The Court held that Congress could restrict the president’s removal authority when dealing with an agency "charged with duties neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative," and that the FTC was meant to operate "free from executive control."

By distinguishing such officers from purely executive officials—who remain removable at will—the ruling became a constitutional foundation for modern independent agencies.

Long-Running Conservative Target

The Justice Department now argues that Humphrey’s Executor should be overruled, asserting that Article II grants the president "conclusive and preclusive" removal authority.

Solicitor General D. John Sauer wrote that the 1935 ruling "was always egregiously wrong."

The position aligns with the Court’s recent trajectory.

In Seila Law (2020), the Court emphasized that "the president’s removal power is the rule, not the exception," allowing only narrow limitations.

Trump’s brief in the present case builds on that framework, arguing that multimember agencies such as the FTC exercise "considerable executive power" through rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication.

Opposition’s Argument

Slaughter’s lawyers rely on constitutional history and the doctrine established in 1935.

Their opposition brief states that "Humphrey’s Executor controls this case," arguing that the FTC’s removal protections remain valid because its functions still include quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial responsibilities.

The brief also notes that the Court has repeatedly described the 1935 decision as good law.

Justice Elena Kagan, writing earlier this year, stressed that past limits on removal restrictions do not extend to multimember boards with structures like the FTC’s.

Second Question: Can Courts Reinstate Officials?

A separate issue concerns judicial remedies.

Petitioners argue that courts lack authority to order reinstatement of a removed officer, saying such orders intrude on Article II.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote earlier this year that wrongfully removed officials may be entitled to back pay but "not reinstatement."

The question also bears on the separate removal of Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook.

The Court has signaled that the Federal Reserve’s structure may warrant different treatment because of its unique historical position.

How Important Is Humphrey’s Executor Now?

Scholars are divided over the precedent’s continued relevance.

Nicholas Barrow argues that Humphrey’s Executor originally permitted tenure protections only for officers whose "duties are neither political nor executive" and that its extension to today’s broad regulatory commissions is "ironic," because it now insulates officials who wield core executive power.

Daniel Crane similarly concludes that the case’s factual premises have eroded, arguing the FTC is no longer a nonpartisan, uniquely expert body but "essentially a law enforcement agency beholden to the will of Congress."

By contrast, Aditya Bamzai and Peter Shane argue that Humphrey’s Executor remains a foundational constraint on executive power.

Bamzai emphasizes early constitutional practice favoring presidential control, while Shane stresses Congress’s authority to design agencies and cautions—invoking Justice Story—that removing such limits risks turning administrators into "mere tools and creatures of the president."

Potential Turning Point

If the Court overturns Humphrey’s Executor, presidents could gain near-total discretion over independent-agency leadership, reshaping regulatory policy across the federal government.

Supporters say such authority is constitutionally required; opponents warn it would erode the separation of powers that has guided federal governance for generations.

Following the Supreme Court hearing on Monday, Brent Skorup, Cato Institute scholar, released the following statement to Newsweek: “In recent decades, so-called 'independent' federal agencies have accumulated vast executive power—issuing rules, adjudicating disputes, and imposing severe financial penalties for regulatory violations. Yet courts continue to treat these agencies—such as the Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Communications Commission—as if they were mere 'judicial or legislative aids' from a bygone era. On that basis, officials within these agencies have been wrongly insulated from presidential removal.

“In Trump v. Slaughter, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to halt the leakage of executive power to unelected, removal-protected regulators. Doing so would help preserve the Constitution’s separation of powers and restore political accountability.

“During oral arguments today, most Justices appeared concerned about the rise of independent agencies and the lack of accountability for the officials who run them. We are hopeful the Court will hold that the Constitution forbids such removal restrictions and will overrule Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935). That would restore a measure of accountability and strengthen individual liberty.”

Late Monday, Democratic U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota released a statement to Newsweek: "Congress has long used its power to establish independent agencies to protect consumers, workers, investors, and others without undue political pressure. Commissioner Slaughter’s unlawful firing goes against nearly a century of precedent that ensures these agencies remain independent and work for Americans, not the President’s friends and donors. It is deeply troubling that conservative justices appear ready to give the president even more unchecked power."

(L-R) Professor Caleb E. Nelson, University of Virginia School of Law, U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar, Brent Skorup legal fellow Cato Institute’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies.

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Professor Caleb E. Nelson, who teaches civil procedure, federal courts and statutory interpretation at the University of Virginia School of Law, told Newsweek that “the text of the Constitution” does not “compel anything like the strong version of the unitary-executive theory,” and the historical record is “at least mixed,” with “the history of most of the last 160 years” rejecting any notion of “unfettered Presidential power to remove all principal executive officers.”

He notes that, until recently, the theory has been “more common among lawyers in the executive branch than elsewhere,” a point reflected in recent writing by Cass Sunstein. Nelson stresses that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to make “reasonable judgment calls about how to structure the executive branch,” including decisions about whether removal should be at will or limited.

On practical consequences, he warns that it would be “obviously a bad idea” for some agencies’ members to be removable at will, highlighting the role of the Merit Systems Protection Board, which “protects executive-branch employees against violations of the civil-service laws and other illegal employment practices.”

Given this mission, Nelson argues, “there are strong reasons for its members to have some decisional independence,” and he questions whether “the nation will be better off if the vast majority of government employees” must “fear and obey” the president.

What People Are Saying

John Yoo, UC Berkeley law professor: "The future of the independence of the administrative state is at issue."

Brian Fitzpatrick, Vanderbilt law professor: "It’s very likely the Supreme Court is going to say that…he has to have control of the people helping him execute those laws."

Slaughter’s attorneys, in a response brief (via National Constitution Center): "The case asks 'has this Court gotten it wrong for the last 90 years?'"

What Happens Next

The Court’s upcoming ruling in Trump v. Slaughter will determine whether presidents can dismiss independent-agency leaders at will and whether judges can reinstate them, a judgment that could restructure major regulators and alter the balance of power in Washington.

Updated 12/10/2025, 6:22 p.m. ET: This article has been updated with comment from Professor Caleb Nelson.

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